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1. Introduction 
 
Secessionist movements present themselves to the global public as analogues of colonial 
liberation movements: long-established identities are denied rights of self-determination 
by quasi-imperial authorities. Self-determination is presented as the solution to the 
challenge of peaceful coexistence between distinct peoples. The global public not only 
accepts this message but reinforces it: both Hollywood and diasporas relay it back to 
populations in developing countries. In this paper, we will argue that the discourse of 
secessionist movements cannot be taken at face value. We will suggest that a more 
realistic characterization of secessionist movements is that their sense of political identity 
is typically a recent contrivance designed to support perceived economic advantage, if the 
secession is successful, and facilitated by popular ignorance. 
 
2. The thesis: economic advantage determines political identity 
 
Our analysis rests primarily upon two distinct building blocks. The first is that of 
Anderson (1983). He argues that groups large enough to function politically cannot be 
genuine `communities’ in the sense of being networks of social interaction. People who 
support the same political party, regardless of its agenda, do not generally know each 
other, nor are they related. Nevertheless, some political parties attempt to attract votes by 
appealing to a common sense of identity. Anderson’s key point is that this sense of 
common identity must be ' imagined'  since it does not reflect objective social interaction. 
Potentially, people can ' imagine'  any of a myriad of identities. In primitive societies,   3 
tribal groupings based on kinship and genuine social interaction were seldom more than 
10,000 people. These genuine communities can be amalgamated into larger political 
groupings, and correspondingly larger geographic units, in many ways: there are few, if 
any, 'natural', 'organic', political communities resting on a common and exclusive ethnic 
identity.  We unlock the puzzle of identity politics by identifying which of these myriad 
of potential identities 'work', in the sense of being accepted by sufficient people to 
establish a functioning political organization capable of mobilizing votes, violence or 
both.  
 
Our second building block is the analysis of Buchanan and Faith (1987). They make the 
simple point that, since taxation is borne differentially by the rich, as the rate of taxation 
is increased, at some point the rich would be better off if they could redraw the 
boundaries of the tax authority so as to exclude themselves. They would lose the public 
goods provided by the authority to its population, but would be able to provide such 
goods themselves more cheaply. The actual context with which Buchanan and Faith are 
concerned is local government boundaries within the USA. However, their insight can be 
applied much more broadly.  
 
We suggest that the common economic interest of the minority of the population that is 
rich, as identified by Buchanan and Faith, functions as the vital ingredient in identity 
politics. That is, secessionist political communities invent themselves when part of the 
population perceives secession to be economically advantageous.  
   4 
Secession is by definition spatial. That is, the exiting group must inhabit contiguous 
territories that can form a unity distinct from the existing political entity. In the normal 
case in which the richer part of the national population is geographically dispersed – for 
example, living in the better suburbs of each city –  secession is not the appropriate 
political response no matter how high the tax rate. At the most, rich people will simply 
emigrate, possibly to a common location. Hence, if economic advantage drives secession, 
it can only do so where economic advantage is spatially concentrated: locality X must be 
significantly better off than locality Y. Once this is the case then the inhabitants of 
locality X may come to identify themselves politically as `X’s, with a political agenda of 
separation.  
 
Generally, however, overt greed tends to be understated as the main basis for political 
mobilization. The viable political discourse of X-identity is more likely to conjure up 
some past shared roots of X-inhabitants or some perceived injustice perpetrated upon 
them, currently or in the past. This is not to suggest that the politicians who present their 
secessionist movements in such terms are anything other than genuine. The level of time 
commitment necessary for political leadership is likely to attract those who genuinely 
hold romantic attachments to their real or imagined roots, or those who are most 
desperate to be included. It is relatively common that the most extreme players in identity 
politics are not genuine members of the groups they purport to lead. For example, the 
father of the Irish leader Devalera was Spanish, the father of the American black power 
leader Michael X was white, and the mother of Goldsmith, leader of the British   5 
isolationist Referendum Party, was French. These people were obviously not motivated 
by economic considerations.  
 
It is, however, critical to distinguish between the motivation of the leadership of a 
secessionist movement and that of its supporters. There are thousands of minor political 
movements whose passionately committed leaders are of no consequence because they 
cannot muster sufficient support. Especially where a movement is a political party rather 
than an army, most of its support will come not from people who are passionately 
committed, but from those who have only some vague sense that the party is advancing 
their interests. 
 
Natural resources are not the only way by which a contiguous part of the national 
population can come to imagine itself as a political community. However, they are 
particularly potent: they are usually `discovered’ at a particular moment, the arch-typical 
event perhaps being  a gold rush. Additionally, the prices of natural resources are volatile, 
with periodic spikes, so that there are precise moments when the economic value  of a 
particular resource becomes dramatically valuable. A further attraction of natural 
resources for the popular imagination is that, unlike say technological discoveries, the 
resulting income accrues to ownership rather than to effort: in economic terms, these are 
`rents’ rather than a return on capital or entrepreneurship. Ownership of a natural 
resource discovery thus has some of the same appeal as winning a lottery – it is wealth 
without work. The reality of natural resource discoveries has usually been quite 
disappointing – revenues are seldom used well and resource-dependent economies have   6 
actually substantially underperformed (Auty, 2001). We speculate that the allure of 
claiming ownership of a natural resource discovery, like the allure of a lottery, depends in 
part upon an exaggerated perception of its value, and that it disproportionately attracts the 
support of the less educated.  
 
Before elaborating, it might be useful to give a concrete example of this process at its 
clearest, namely Scottish nationalism. Scotland ceased to be an independent polity some 
300 years ago, when its population entered into a union with England and Wales. In the 
nineteenth century, there was an `invention of culture,’ when writers such as Sir Walter 
Scott imagined a rural Highlands identity for what was by then a highly urban population. 
For much of the twentieth century, this cultural revivalism supported a minor political 
movement for independence, which attracted very few votes.  
 
This electoral irrelevance was transformed quite suddenly and  can be dated with 
precision because of the radically different success of the Scottish National Party in all 
elections up to and including that of 1970, as compared to their breakthrough in both  
elections  in 1974. In the 1970 general election, the Scottish National Party had only one 
Member of Parliament (representing the remote Western Isles), and received only 11% of 
the Scottish vote. After the two general elections of 1974, the party had eleven members 
of parliament and over 30% of the Scottish vote.
1 Thus, in electoral terms Scotland as a 
political community dates back only to 1974. Something happened between 1970 and 
1974 as a result of which many people living in Scotland switched to imagining 
themselves as part of a geographic political community, as opposed to  their previous 
                                                    
1 Scottish National Party (2002).   7 
class-based political identification. There is little doubt as to the cause, i.e., the dramatic 
rise in the international price of oil price as a result of the Yom Kippur war of 1973.  
 
Oil was discovered in the North Sea in 1966, and most of it  was off the coast of 
Scotland.  When the price of oil quadrupled in 1973, the British government imposed 
taxes on the oil companies so that approximately  90% of their additional oil revenues 
accrued to the government. The Scottish Nationalist Party ran a campaign with the slogan 
'It's Scotland's Oil' and argued that, if Scotland were independent, the tax revenues would 
accrue to the five  million people of Scotland rather than to the 50 million people of 
Britain. Per capita oil revenues for inhabitants of Scotland would rise ten-fold if the other 
45 million people were excluded. The fragile and recent cause of romantic nationalism 
could thus be allied to the robust and ancient cause of economic self-interest.  
 
The critical nature of oil resources in the emergence of Scotland as an 'imagined 
community' is suggested not just be this striking temporal coincidence but by a 
comparison with Welsh and Breton secessionist movements. These movements share the 
same romantic Celtic nationalism as Scotland, but there is no oil on their territories. The 
Welsh movement has attempted to build a parallel case by virtue of the fact that the water 
supply for the English city of Birmingham comes from Wales (`hands off Welsh water'). 
However, perhaps because water is seen as being legitimately free, it has not ignited the 
greed of Welsh voters. The Scottish Nationalist Party is an entirely conventional political 
party – it has had no association with violence. There have been attempts to establish   8 
violent secessionist organizations in Scotland, Wales and Brittany, but none has become 
politically significant.   
 
We have dwelt on the rise of the secessionist movement in Scotland because it so 
obviously supports  our thesis. Natural resources are usually geographically concentrated 
in a particular part of a country,  so countries that are heavily dependent upon natural 
resource exports are likely to be prone to secessionist movements. Sometimes natural 
resources are not geographically concentrated, and sometimes other important sources of 
income are highly concentrated, and  we should expect to find exceptions. However, if 
our thesis is correct, we should expect to find many other examples. In fact, there are 
many such examples, usually masquerading under the guise of romantic nationalism. 
However, before turning to them, we will present a systematic statistical analysis of 
secession to the extent that this is possible. 
 
3. Secession: a quantitative analysis  
 
In our previous work, we have investigated empirically the causes of civil war (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 1998, 2002a, 2002b). We considered all the large-scale civil wars that  
began during  the period 1960-1999 and sought to explain them in terms of observable 
socio-economic characteristics. Specifically, we attempt to explain the risk of war 
commencing in each five-year sub-period in terms of characteristics at the start of the 
sub-period. Some of these wars had secessionist aspirations; others did not. Taking them 
all together, our results appear somewhat surprisingly at variance with much of the   9 
discourse on civil war. We find that there are three major risk factors: a low level of per 
capita income, a slow rate of growth of income, and high dependence upon primary 
commodity exports, this last being especially important. We have not found either 
economic inequality or political repression to be statistically significant. Turning to the 
social composition of the population, we find that, if the largest ethnic group constitutes 
between 45 percent and 90 percent of the population, the risk of civil war is 
approximately doubled, although this is a fairly small effect by comparison with primary 
commodities. Further, having a large diaspora living in the United States also 
substantially increases the risk of civil war (we allow for the fact that wars often increase 
the size of diasporas). Other than this, a high degree of ethnic and religious diversity 
actually makes a country significantly safer than if it were homogenous.  
 
Our explanation for this superficially puzzling pattern has been that the occurrence of 
civil war is better understood in terms of opportunity than in terms of motive. A high 
degree of inequality, political repression, and ethnic and religious differentiation may all 
increase the sense of grievance among parts of the population, but, in most situations, 
people do not have a realistic opportunity to rebel. Primary commodity exports may be 
important partly because they provide rebel organizations with a ready source of finance. 
Similarly, low per capita income and slow growth may lower the costs of recruiting to the 
rebel army, while at the same time they weaken the capacity of the government to oppose 
such an army. In the limit, where rebellion is feasible it can be presumed to occur, and 
there will always be some group sufficiently motivated to resort to violence regardless of 
the intensity of objective grievances.    10 
 
We now turn specifically to those civil wars, which appear in some sense to have been 
motivated by secessionist goals. We are therefore focusing upon a subset of civil wars. If 
our general thesis about secession were correct, then we would expect secessionist civil 
wars to be strongly linked to primary commodity exports. Note that our existing results 
constitute powerful evidence for this thesis. As we will see, most civil wars are in some 
sense secessionist, and we have found that the single most important determinant of civil 
wars is dependence upon primary commodity exports. However, here we can push the 
test of the thesis further, since primary commodity dependence might be differentially 
important in those civil wars that have secessionist objectives. If our general thesis about 
civil wars were correct, then we would expect the key differences between political and 
violent secessionist movements to be the other major determinants of civil war – per 
capita income and economic growth. Secession would be pursued by political means in 
high-income rapidly growing countries and by violent means in low-income slowly 
growing countries.  
 
The objectives of rebel groups are not always readily observable, and we distinguish 
between secessionist and other civil wars by using data on ethnic and religious wars from 
three different data sources: Sambanis (2000), Licklider (1995) and the State Failure 
Project (Esty et al, 1998). We concentrate our analysis on the data collected by Sambanis 
(2000) and list all civil wars in Appendix Table 5A. In addition, we present further results 
using data from the alternative data sources in the Appendix. These robustness checks 
show that all three data sets provide similar results.    11 
 
In Table 1 we present some descriptive statistics. In the first column we list the means of 
all of the socio-economic determinants of civil wars as examined in Collier and Hoeffler 
(2002a). The means for countries that experienced an outbreak of civil war during 1960 
and 1999 are shown in the second column. Countries in which civil wars occur have a 
lower secondary school enrolment rate for men, are poorer, experience negative growth, 
have a higher level of social fractionalization, have enjoyed a shorter peace period since 
the last war, and are, on average, larger.  These countries are characterized by similar 
primary commodity export to GDP ratios as are found in peaceful countries; they are 
similarly likely to be dominated by one ethnic group; and the degree of population 
concentration is almost the same as in peaceful countries. The last two columns of Table 
1 compare secessionist/identity wars and other civil wars (ideologically motivated wars). 
The descriptive statistics for the two different types of wars are similar. However, the 
degree of social fractionalization is higher in secessionist/identity wars, and their 
population is, on average, larger and poorer.  Their peace period also tends to be shorter; 
they are less often characterized by ethnic dominance; and they have lower primary 
commodity to GDP ratios. 
 
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
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We now use logit regression analysis to determine whether those wars that are in some 
sense 'about' identity have different causes from those with other discourses such as 
ideology.  As a benchmark, we replicate the results from Collier and Hoeffler (2002a) in 
Table 2, column 1. We find that we can clearly distinguish between war and peace 
countries: countries with certain characteristics were on average more or less likely to 
experience a civil war than others. In this sample, we analyze 46 wars.  
 
In column 2, we run the same regression but confine the event to be explained to those 
civil wars that are secessionist. We then compare this regression with that for 
ideologically motivated wars (column 3). The key hypothesis to be tested here is that 
primary commodity exports are more likely to cause a secessionist civil war than an 
ideological civil war. Recall that when we take civil wars in their entirety, these natural 
resources play a powerful and dangerous role, greatly increasing risk. There are two 
major reasons why natural resources might be a powerful risk factor – the opportunity 
which they provide to rebel groups to finance their activities during conflict and the lure 
of capturing resource ownership permanently if the rebellion is victorious. The former is 
common to both ideological and secessionist rebellions, but the latter – long-term capture 
– is differentially important for secession. After all, if victorious, the secessionists will 
carry off the resources.  
 
The regressions support the hypothesis that natural resources are differentially likely to 
cause secessionist civil wars. Although primary commodity exports increase the risk of 
both types of civil war, the coefficient in the identity war regression is three times larger   13 
that that for ideological wars. Despite the small size of the sample, this difference is 
statistically significant at the five percent level. This result is not dependent upon the 
particular definition of identity wars used by Sambanis. In the Appendix we show that the 
same result is reached using the two alternative specifications of secessionist wars. Table 
3A uses data from Licklider (1995) and Table 4A uses data from the State Failure Project 
(1998). In Table 2A we show that the result is also robust to changing the specification of 
the regression: here we use income per capita rather than secondary school enrolment 
rates and the results are similar.  
 
The last two columns of Table 2 are limited the to war observations, i.e., where there is  a 
civil war, we examine whether identity wars are different from ideological wars. The 
event in these logit regressions is defined as identity war, i.e., if a war was about identity, 
the dependent variable takes a value of one and otherwise takes a value of zero. Our 
results rest on a limited number of war observations, but the measure of overall fit 
(pseudo R




--- Table 2 about here --- 
 
In order to examine the primary commodity results in more detail, we include a dummy 
for oil exporting countries (column 4). The coefficient is close to being significant and is 
significant in the alternative specification (see Table 2A). Conditional upon the overall   14 
level of primary commodity exports, civil wars in countries with large oil exports are 
more likely to be secessionist and less likely to be about ideology.  We investigated other 
primary commodities but could not find any evidence that other raw materials have 
distinct effects. This is consistent with our speculation that oil wealth has an exaggerated 
effect on  popular political imagination. 
 
Wars are more likely to be secessionist the smaller the proportion of the male population 
that has secondary education (column 5). Although secondary education is fairly closely 
correlated with per capita income, if the regression is repeated with per capita income 
instead of secondary education as an explanatory variable, per capita income is 
completely insignificant (see Table 2A). Thus, it appears that it is education rather than 
income that is important. This is consistent with our speculation that the allure of natural 
resources is reinforced by popular ignorance. It is easier for politicians to exaggerate the 
value of a geographic identity associated with a natural resource endowment if the 
population is uneducated. A lack of education might also make it easier for politicians to 
appeal to romantic notions of belonging to a common community based on ethnicity or 
religion. For example, the study by Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) finds that, as the level 
of education rises, the intensity of religious identity diminishes. It seems plausible that 
identity politics is easier to play if citizens are uneducated. 
 
Geographic variables are also significant – civil wars are more likely to be secessionist 
the larger and more dispersed the population. This is consistent with the natural resource 
thesis: if there is a large and highly dispersed national population then inequality of   15 
resource endowment is likely to be more pronounced – a minority of the population is 
likely to be located on top of the natural resources.  
 
A final variable that is close to significance (or significant in the alternative 
specifications) is social fractionalization, reflecting the extent to which the society is 
differentiated by ethnicity and religion. Wars of identity are actually less likely to occur, 
relative to ideological wars, the more fragmented is the society. Why might this be? A 
possible explanation is that a successful secessionist resource grab depends upon creating 
an imagined community that is broadly coincident with that which occupies the territory 
on which the resources are located. If the society is too fragmented, this will require 
unifying disparate groups of people at the same time as these groups are persuaded to see 
themselves as distinct from the national population. As we see when we turn to some 
examples of attempted secessions, sometimes this is highly problematic. 
 
Thus, the characteristics that generate a high risk of secessionist civil war appear to be a 
combination of high levels of natural resource endowments and low levels of education.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis that resource capture is an important objective of 
the rebellion. We should stress that objectives and motivations, especially when they are 
an amorphous mixture of romanticism and self-interest, are better revealed by behavior 
than by study of the political discourse utilized, which includes both propaganda and self-
delusion. The Scottish Nationalist Party did not say, `If we turn ourselves into a political 
community, we can grab the oil wealth'. The leaders of the party were drawn from the 
tiny handful of romantic nationalists who already thought of Scotland as a political   16 
community. Their message was, `The oil is really ours, but it is being stolen by the 
English'. But the massive redefinition of working-class inhabitants of Scotland between 
1970 and 1974 from being members of the British working class – and hence voting for 
the Labour Party – to being members of Scotland – and hence voting for the SNP – is 
surely better accounted for by a perceived change in economic self-interest than by a 
sudden recognition of primal identity. 
 
4. Some secessions in practice 
 
We have suggested that secessions depend upon the invention of an imagined political 
community and that natural resources will often be instrumental in transforming this 
invention from the pipe-dream of a handful of romantics to the reality of a large political 
or military organization. Once this transformation has occurred, the history of the 
secessionist movement will, of course, trace its origins back to the supposedly 'far-seeing' 
romantics and from them to the misty shared origins of kinship or religion. However, 
such histories do not provide an even approximately accurate explanation of how 
secessionist movements become serious organizations. There are literally hundreds of 
romantic secessionist groups – probably most areas of the earth are subject to the claims 
of one or more of them. But the mere existence of such a group does not help us to 
understand those few secessionist movements that, by virtue of their violence or electoral 
support, have become  serious political phenomena.
2   
 
                                                    
2 For a detailed discussion of the determinants of secessionist claims please refer to Jenne (2003).    17 
We will now consider some of these serious secessionist movements case-by-case, to see 
whether our thesis has plausibility beyond the evidence of the regression analysis and the 
example of Scotland.  
 
First, consider two major failed secessionist movements in Africa, the attempt of Katanga 
to secede from the Congo, and the attempt of Biafra to secede from Nigeria. Since all 
African countries are composed of many ethno-linguistic groups, these movements each 
laid claim to nationhood for an ethnic group. Again, the only question of importance is 
why it was these ethnic groups and not others. Biafra provides a particularly clear 
illustration of the role of natural resources, because oil became significant for the 
Nigerian economy only in the mid-1960s.  Prior to oil, Nigerian politics had been 
dominated by an alliance between the dominant tribe in the South-East, the Ibo, with the 
dominant tribe in the North, the Hausa-Fulani. This alliance excluded the dominant tribe 
of the South-West, the Yoruba. Far from coincidentally, the main natural resource in 
Nigeria prior to oil was cocoa, which was produced in the South-West. Hence, the long-
standing Nigerian political alliance was between the two natural resource-scarce tribes, to 
enforce the sharing of the rents on cocoa production.  
 
The discovery of oil, which was located entirely in South East Nigeria, destroyed the 
rationale for this political alignment. Very rapidly, a new coalition formed between the 
North and the South-West against the oil-rich South-East. In response, the Ibo of the 
South-West declared their independence, and war followed for the next three years. This 
was decidedly not a war of ethnic identity – the oil resources being fought over were   18 
actually off the coast of Port Harcourt, whereas the Ibo heartland was inland, around 
Enugu. The Ibo, like the other large tribes, was largely a nineteenth century 
amalgamation of hundreds of much smaller genuine communities, and so precisely who 
was and was not an Ibo was not fixed. When Biafra was defeated, many small ethnic 
groups redefined themselves as non-Ibo: identity fluctuated according to convenience. 
 
Biafra was a natural resource grab as unmistakable as the rise of the Scottish Nationalist 
Party. It is notable that Nigeria currently has one serious secessionist rebellion, in the 
Niger Delta. Even more than was the case in Biafra, the rebellion is geographically 
coincident with the oil resources. In the intervening thirty years, however, Nigeria has 
done much to diffuse secessionist pressures. The chosen technique has been a formula for 
sharing oil revenues between regional governments: each regional government receives a 
fixed amount, plus an allowance for its population. This has created strong financial 
incentives to create new regions. If a region is divided, its population gets more money – 
the same population allowance, but two fixed amounts instead of one. So strongly are the 
boundaries of imagined political communities driven by perceived economic interests 
from oil rents that, whereas in 1970 Nigeria had only three regions, it now has 36. Of 
course, each of these splits has occurred as groups within a region have asserted their 
`historic rights' to self-government. Surely, to the extent that most Nigerians think about 
why they want new regions, uppermost in their minds may well be these 'historic 
identities'. But to interpret why Nigeria has divided into so many regions as simply a 
reassertion of local identity would be to miss why this has happened in Nigeria rather 
than elsewhere.    19 
 
The Katanga secession is similarly intimately related to the fact that this was the mineral 
heartland of the Congo. There was overt involvement in the secession by South African 
mining interests, so that it could more plausibly be interpreted as an external and 
commercial movement than as a bottom-up cry to protect a historic identity. As in 
Nigeria, thirty years after the initial secession was defeated, there is renewed secessionist 
pressure, far more intense than in Nigeria, and quite evidently related to natural 
resources. As previously, the secessionist movement appears to be more closely related to 
external commercial interests than to bottom-up assertions of identity or demands for 
self-government for its own sake.  
 
Indonesia is, like Nigeria, a large, resource-rich country facing secessionist pressures. To 
date, that of East Timor has been successful, and that of Aceh, at the other end of the 
archipelago, has been contained. Both of these provinces are rich in natural gas with 
small populations, whereas the island on which most of the Indonesian population lives, 
Java, has neither oil nor gas. East Timor, despite having a population of only 800,000 
people, is not socially cohesive: indeed, it has a prior history of war.
3 Since gaining 
independence the government has concluded an offshore oil and gas contract. Prior to 
independence, these resources were untapped, because of the disputed legal status of the 
oil and gas fields. Aceh has a per capita GDP triple the Indonesian average, although this 
is not reflected in living standards, since the oil income accrues nationally rather than 
locally. After a dispute about an oil contract, a  businessman formed the independence 
                                                    
3 In 1975 the Portuguese colony of East Timor was invaded by Indonesian forces. For an in depth analysis 
of the conflicts in Indonesia see Ross (2002).   20 
movement in 1976. Both East Timor and Aceh indisputably have distinct historic 
identities that can be tapped. However, this is true all over Indonesia. The ability of these 
particular secessionist movements to function effectively over long periods may, 
however, be related to the perception on the part of the populations of these areas that 
secession would confer ownership of important resources. 
 
Another long-standing secessionist movement is that of the Southern Sudan. The 
populations of the Southern Sudan do not have a common identity – indeed, there has 
been civil war within the region as well as between it and Northern Sudan. In the late 
1960s, substantial oil fields were discovered in Southern Sudan. Until very recently these 
could not be exploited because of war, but they may have provided these disparate 
populations some sense of political commonality. 
 
We now turn to three secessions that are not linked to natural resources – Eritrea, 
Slovenia, and Croatia. Superficially, these do not fit our thesis at all, since they are all 
supposedly about deep-rooted assertions of identity. However, all three of them fit 
surprisingly closely into the Buchanan-Faith framework. Eritrea was the richest region of 
Ethiopia. This was not due to natural resources, but because Italian colonists had 
occupied Eritrea well before the rest of Ethiopia and so had established industry there. 
Eritrea had a per capita income around double that of the rest of Ethiopia. In 1951, 
following the withdrawal of the Italians and their successors, the British, Eritrea held a 
referendum as to whether to become independent or to federate with Ethiopia. The 
population voted for federation, suggesting that at that time Eritrea was not an 'imagined   21 
political community'. A decade later, the emperor of Ethiopia dissolved the Federation 
and imposed direct rule. This had important fiscal implications – net tax transfers would 
evidently be from Eritrea to Ethiopia. Shortly after the dissolution of the Federation, the 
Eritrean independence movement was formed. With the support of a large diaspora, it 
was astonishingly successful, although independence came only after a very long military 
struggle.  
 
Slovenia was the richest region of Yugoslavia. In the Tito years, Yugoslavia was a 
federation, so that large income inequalities were not offset by taxation. However, in the 
economic chaos following the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic policy in 
Yugoslavia was substantially centralized; for example, foreign exchange reserves were 
pooled. This enabled the Serbian dictator to use non-Serb resources for his own agenda.  
Slovenia was able to secede from Yugoslavia, partly thanks to diplomatic cover from the 
EU. Once Slovenia had seceded, Croatia became the richest region of the remaining 
Yugoslavia. With the Slovene precedent, it too seceded, although in this case the 
secession was not peaceful.
4  
 
Thus, all three of these successful secessions had elements of `tax-exits'.  Of course, in 
each case the shared economic interest coincided with cultural identities. However, 
cultural identities are usually fluid. For example, Eritrea, although a country of only 2.5 
million people carved out of the 50 million people of Ethiopia, is far from culturally 
                                                    
4 Although Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on the same day ( 25
th July 1991), Slovenia held a 
referendum and prepared for independence before Croatia. Croats did not want to be left behind and 
president Tudjman stated that if Slovenia seceded, Croatia would not stay “a day longer” in Yugoslavia 
(Silber and Little, p 148).   22 
homogenous. Its population includes three major religious groups, five ethnic groups, 
nine official languages, and three official writing scripts. Further, the creation of the 
country split its major ethno-linguistic group, the Tigrini, into a majority living in 
Ethiopia and a minority in Eritrea. Ethiopia is full of groups with secessionist aspirations, 
but the only question of interest is why the only successful secession is that of Eritrea. 
 
We now turn to two major secessionist movements that, while not linked to natural 
resources, can be seen as having economic causes: Bangladesh and the Confederacy. 
Bangladesh was initially East Pakistan. Pakistan was itself created as a religious 
secession from India negotiated by a few political leaders as part of independence from 
Britain. Because Pakistan did not secede from an independent India but was created as 
part of the process of decolonization, it is probably best treated as distinct from the 
secessions that we are analyzing. The secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan, despite a 
common religious identity, can be seen in economic terms. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
Pakistan embarked upon an industrialization strategy of import substitution behind high 
protective tariff barriers. This was a standard strategy at the time, but Pakistan took the 
policy to extremes. In the early stages of such industrialization, industry tends to 
agglomerate in a single location to reap scale economies, and, in Pakistan, the industry 
agglomerated in the West. As is inevitable with highly protected import substitution, the 
policy involved a massive transfer from exports, which were implicitly taxed through 
exchange rate overvaluation, to industry. Pakistan’s exports at the time were dominated 
by jute, which was produced in East Pakistan. Hence, the economic policy involved a 
massive transfer from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. The lack of contiguity of East and   23 
West Pakistan, and the evident interest of India in dividing Pakistan, greatly facilitated 
secession. However, there also was a clear economic incentive for East Pakistan to 
secede.  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the secession of the US Confederacy was very similar to  the 
secession of East Pakistan. The Northern states were primarily manufacturing, while the 
Southern states produced the export good, cotton. In 1828, the North attempted to impose 
high protective tariffs, which would have produced a large income transfer from the 
South to the North. This tariff proposal was termed in the South the `tariff of 
abominations’ and was vigorously opposed. Northern interests backed down until 1860, 
when the tariff was imposed. Obviously, this was not the only issue that provoked 
Southern secession, but it is often greatly underplayed relative to the more readily 
grasped issue of slavery (World Bank, 2000).  
 
There is one important recent secession which radically contradicts our thesis, that of 
Slovakia. Slovakia was the poorer part of the Czech-Slovak federation and so stood to 
benefit fiscally from continued federation. In economic terms, Slovakia made a serious 
mistake by seceding. There is only one respect in which the secession of Slovakia is 
compatible with out thesis, which was that it was not resisted by the richer partner, the 
Czechs, but instead was agreed to with an otherwise astonishing alacrity. However, fully 
peaceful secessions are rare, because the circumstances in which they are in the interests 
of both parties are rare. Usually, secession appears to be initiated by the party that will   24 
benefit economically from it, and these attempts are invariably opposed by the  party that 
will suffer economically.   
 
 
5. Diasporas and secession 
 
We noted above that in our previous work we have found that the size of the diaspora in 
the United States relative to the population in the home country is a significant predictor 
of the revival of conflict in post-conflict societies. Our results have focused on the US for 
the simple reason that data are readily available. Further, since immigrants to the US have 
a common economic and legal environment, they can more meaningfully be aggregated 
than immigrants located in many different societies. The presumption should be that 
diasporas in other high-income countries have similar effects.  
 
There are various ways in which a diaspora might revive conflict. The two most obvious 
routes are to continue to publicize grievances and/or to finance violent organizations. 
Diasporas are likely to use both of these techniques. First, migration is often partly 
related to a group grievance. Once detached from the home society and living in a highly 
absorptive multi-cultural society, the cultural incentive is for the diaspora to preserve 
prominent aspects of its identity; extremist political allegiance is an inexpensive means of 
asserting that identity. Diasporas do not suffer from the violence that they support and so 
face lower costs than the home population. The diaspora is also considerably richer than 
the home population, so its financial contribution to organizations of violence is   25 
disproportionately important. Further, detachment means that the diaspora never has to 
find a modus vivendi with the group that it opposes, whereas those who remain behind 
face a real need, and are presented with real opportunities, to move on from violence. 
 
Our descriptive statistics in Table 1 do not indicate that countries with identity wars have 
proportionately larger diasporas. However, as discussed above, we rely exclusively on 
US immigration data and therefore place a disproportionate importance on the analysis of 
diaspora communities originating from Latin America and the Caribbean. None of these 
countries experienced a war about identity, and it is thus difficult to find statistical 
evidence for our hypothesis. We would prefer to use aggregated immigration data from 
OECD countries in this analysis; unfortunately no such data set exists. However, case 
study evidence supports the role of diasporas in secession and the revival of violence
5. 
The secession of Slovakia was apparently initiated within the Czechoslovak societies of 
cities in North America.  Most recently, the Kosovo Liberation Army, which desires the 
secession of Kosovo from Yugoslavia and perhaps the secession of the Albanian minority 
from Montenegro, apparently receives substantial material support from Kosovars based 
in Europe. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) secessionist movement in Sri 
Lanka is financed in part from Canada; for example, the 1996 bomb that killed 86 
civilians and injured a further 1,400 in Colombo was mainly financed by the Tamil 
diaspora in Canada.
6 We have already noted the critical role played by the Eritrean 
                                                    
5 For an overview see for example Angoustures and Pascal (1996). 
6 ‘A Singapore bank account opened by a Canadian of Sri Lankan origin was used to pay for 60 tons of 
explosives … imported from the Ukraine by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam …’ (S. Bell, National 
Post 10
th March 2000). It is estimated that the Tamil diaspora raised about $450-500millions worldwide  
per year, much of it was used to supply the Tamil Tigers with arms. However, fewer governments are now 
willing to sanction these fund raising efforts and following the Tigers’ ban in the UK and other countries, 
their funds are drying up (The Economist, March 10
th 2001).   26 
diaspora in the USA. Equally evident, the Irish Republican Army has for many years 
received its material support predominantly from the Irish diaspora in the USA. The 
globalization of political violence thus long pre-dates September 11




6. Conclusion: do secessions deserve support? 
 
Clearly, no generic analysis such as our own can answer the question of whether, in a 
particular case, a secession is likely to be broadly beneficial or to carry serious dangers.  
 
In economic terms, the trend is towards greater integration rather than secession. Thus, 
the European Union is attempting to forge a common policy across fifteen states and is 
likely to have several more members in the near future. On a more modest scale, NAFTA 
is also building a common economic area among the USA, Canada, and Mexico. In 
contrast to these integrating trends among developed countries, many developing and 
transition countries are facing strong secessionist pressures, often supported by diasporas 
in multi-cultural high-income societies.  
 
If our statistical analysis of civil conflict is broadly correct, then secessions in low-
income countries may carry some dangers. Secession commonly reduces ethnic and 
religious fractionalization without eliminating it: the quest for an ethnically pure society 
is a chimera. Our results suggest that a reduction in ethnic and religious fractionalization   27 
is likely to increase the danger of civil war rather than diminish it. Indeed, the most 
dangerous countries from the aspect of social composition are those in which the largest 
ethnic group is in a majority, but with a significant minority present. At present, most 
developing countries are too diverse to be characterized by such `ethnic dominan ce,’ but 
secessions are more likely to create such dominance than to eliminate it. For example, 
once Slovenia and Croatia had seceded from Yugoslavia, Serbs became ethnically 
dominant in the remaining territory, perhaps contributing to the violent conflicts in 
Bosnia and Kosovo.  
 
Further, if our analysis is broadly correct, secessionist movements should not in general 
be seen as cries for social justice. Those few secessionist movements that are able to 
scale-up to being organizations with a serious political or military capability are likely to 
occur in rich regions and contain an element of a ‘resource grab’. They may also reflect 
the fantasies of diasporas settled in rich countries and a poorly educated population. 
Secessionist organizations are usually built on the foundations of romantic localism, and 
this will continue to shape their discourse. However, such localism is found almost 
everywhere. That viable secessionist organizations are rare indicates that romantic 
localism, and its associated discourse of grievance, is not by itself decisive. Romantic 
localism is not necessarily dishonest or irrelevant, but it offers a misleading explanation 
for  what makes a secessionist organization strong.  
 
If the cocktail of natural resource wealth, diasporas, and illiteracy succeeds in 
dismembering large, multi-cultural developing and transition societies, the world is   28 
unlikely to become a safer place. The secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, heroic as it was, 
has not resulted in peace. It transformed a civil war into an international war, with a huge 
escalation in human and economic costs. It also has created a nation of 50 million people 
without direct access to the sea.  
 
Nor are the small new societies that are created by secession necessarily internally 
cohesive. In Eritrea, the President recently arrested around half of the members of his 
cabinet. East Timor has sixteen different political parties, one for every 50,000 people. It 
would surely be disturbing if, at the same time as developed countries were integrating as 
never before, developing countries were disintegrating into tiny but disputatious ethnic 
theme parks.   29 
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Table 1: Means of the Socio-Economic Determinants of War  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Sample  War 
Starts 
Identity 
War   
Ideology  
War 
         
Male Secondary Schooling  
(Gross Enrolment Rates) 
42.7  30.3  29  29.2 
         
GDP per capita 
(constant US$) 
3921  1645  1571  1870 
         
GDP per capita growth 
(previous five years) 
1.56  -0.23  -0.26  0.18 
         
Primary commodity exports/GDP  0.164  0.149  0.134  0.165 
         
         
Social fractionalization 
(Index 0-10,000) 
1784  2320  2348  1959 
         
Ethnic Dominance 
(% with main ethnic group 45-90%) 
0.47  0.45  0.42  0.57 
         
Peace duration 
(Months) 
327  221  209  258 
         
Population 
(Millions) 
26.1  43.8  61  11.5 
         
Geographic concentration of the Population 
(Gini-Coefficient 0-1) 
0.58  0.60  0.59  0.62 
         
% of observations where Oil is the main export 
commodity 
0.168  0.25  0.30  0.17 
         
Diaspora 
(relative to population of country of origin)  
0.017  0.004  0.003  0.016 
         
Observations (max-min)  918-1266  54-78  36-47  14-24 
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Table 2: Determinants of Identity Wars 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent Variable  War Start  Identity War   Ideology War  
 
War Type   War Type  
Male Secondary   -0.032  -0.054  -0.008  -0.074  -0.081 
Schooling  (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.509)  (0.091)*  (0.035)** 
(GDP growth)t-1  -0.115  -0.125  -0.088  -0.011  -0.159 
  (0.007)***  (0.016)**  (0.223)  (0.949)  (0.278) 
Primary Commodity   18.937  30.461  10.456  19.191  28.231 
Exports/GDP  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.182)  (0.405)  (0.184) 
(Primary Commodity   -29.443  -55.722  -15.730  -53.192  -48.728 
Exports/GDP)
2  (0.012)**  (0.009)***  (0.286)  (0.217)  (0.205) 
Social Fractionalization  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.019)**  (0.010)**  (0.465)  (0.709)  (0.264) 
Ethnic Dominance  0.670  0.785  0.949  0.757  0.929 
(45-90%)  (0.058)*  (0.083)*  (0.113)  (0.506)  (0.401) 
Peace Duration  -0.004  -0.005  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
  (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.370)  (0.545)  (0.652) 
ln Population  0.768  1.139  0.254  1.601  2.164 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.288)  (0.093)*  (0.016)** 
Geographic Dispersion  -2.487  -4.523  -0.045  -6.619  -5.838 
  (0.013)***  (0.002)***  (0.976)  (0.088)*  (0.094)* 
Oil Dummy        3.872   
        (0.144)   
Observations  688  688  688  42  43 
No of events 
(war observations) 
46  30  13  29  30 
pseudo R
2  0.24  0.34  0.07  0.38  0.36 
 
Note: Logit regressions, all specifications include a constant, p values in parentheses, * 




Table 2A: Determinants of Identity Wars (Alternative Specification) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent Variable  War Start  Identity War   Ideology War  
 
War Type   War Type  
ln GDP per capita   -0.950  -1.098  -0.489  -1.826  -0.492 
  (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.175)  (0.117)  (0.504) 
(GDP growth)t-1  -0.098  -0.080  -0.076  0.130  0.013 
  (0.018)**  (0.100)  (0.285)  (0.414)  (0.897) 
Primary Commodity   16.773  20.362  12.514  -7.208  -4.475 
Exports/GDP  (0.001)***  (0.008)***  (0.092)*  (0.660)  (0.756) 
(Primary Commodity   -23.800  -34.827  -16.843  -15.280  -0.373 
Exports/GDP)
2  (0.018)**  (0.033)**  (0.211)  (0.652)  (0.989) 
Social Fractionalization  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.007)***  (0.015)**  (0.343)  (0.806)  (0.835) 
Ethnic Dominance  0.480  0.519  0.822  0.126  -0.195 
(45-90%)  (0.144)  (0.202)  (0.150)  (0.898)  (0.821) 
Peace Duration  -0.004  -0.005  -0.001  -0.003  -0.006 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.517)  (0.314)  (0.053)* 
ln Population  0.510  0.588  0.254  0.172  0.254 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.247)  (0.724)  (0.432) 
Geographic Dispersion  -0.992  -1.760  0.279  -3.022  -0.679 
  (0.275)  (0.142)  (0.847)  (0.389)  (0.785) 
Oil Dummy        5.071   
        (0.044)**   
Observations  750  750  750  45  48 
No of events 
(war observations) 
52  34  14  32  34 
pseudo R
2  0.22  0.34  0.07  0.33  0.21 
 
Note: Logit regressions, all specifications include a constant, p values in parentheses, * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   34 
 
Table 3A: Determinants of Identity Wars (Licklider Data) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable  Identity War   Ideology War  
 
War Type   War Type  
ln GDP per capita   -0.050  -0.014  -0.695  -0.081 
  (0.001)***  (0.289)  (0.134)  (0.053)* 
(GDP growth)t-1  -0.111  -0.129  4.774  -0.049 
  (0.029)**  (0.120)  (0.137)  (0.807) 
Primary Commodity   29.903  7.158  577.603  51.449 
Exports/GDP  (0.001)***  (0.402)  (0.119)  (0.196) 
(Primary Commodity   -51.078  -13.630  -1,560.809  -64.362 
Exports/GDP)
2  (0.008)***  (0.422)  (0.123)  (0.501) 
Social Fractionalization  -0.000  -0.000  -0.005  -0.001 
  (0.005)***  (0.591)  (0.137)  (0.107) 
Ethnic Dominance  0.706  1.051  -2.267  0.882 
(45-90%)  (0.117)  (0.110)  (0.488)  (0.477) 
Peace Duration  -0.006  -0.000  -0.157  -0.006 
  (0.000)***  (0.838)  (0.135)  (0.229) 
ln Population  1.135  0.136  32.119  3.350 
  (0.000)***  (0.593)  (0.119)  (0.019)** 
Geographic Dispersion  -4.735  0.984  -161.931  -11.062 
  (0.001)***  (0.551)  (0.115)  (0.033)** 
Oil Dummy      138.239   
      (.)   
Observations  688  688  41  42 
No of events 
(war observations) 
31  11  31  31 
pseudo R
2  0.35  0.07  0.78  0.51 
 
Note: Logit regressions, all specifications include a constant, p values in parentheses, * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   35 
 
Table 4A: Determinants of Identity Wars (State Failure Project Data) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable  Identity War   Ideology War  
 
War Type   War Type  
ln GDP per capita   -0.046  -0.015  -0.048  -0.059 
  (0.002)***  (0.250)  (0.237)  (0.126) 
(GDP growth)t-1  -0.149  -0.033  -0.254  -0.316 
  (0.005)***  (0.672)  (0.219)  (0.116) 
Primary Commodity   28.758  11.331  16.143  22.492 
Exports/GDP  (0.004)***  (0.149)  (0.477)  (0.293) 
(Primary Commodity   -51.485  -17.249  -37.606  -40.457 
Exports/GDP)
2  (0.016)**  (0.247)  (0.340)  (0.283) 
Social 
Fractionalization 
-0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.005)***  (0.671)  (0.200)  (0.121) 
Ethnic Dominance  0.805  1.008  1.035  0.994 
(45-90%)  (0.085)*  (0.095)*  (0.403)  (0.415) 
Peace Duration  -0.006  -0.000  -0.007  -0.006 
  (0.000)***  (0.864)  (0.119)  (0.131) 
ln Population  1.082  0.353  1.871  2.331 
  (0.000)***  (0.144)  (0.097)*  (0.029)** 
Geographic 
Dispersion 
-4.020  -0.539  -6.760  -6.145 
  (0.008)***  (0.710)  (0.124)  (0.136) 
Oil Dummy      1.835   
      (0.357)   
Observations  688  688  41  42 
No of events 
(war observations) 
29  13  29  29 
pseudo R
2  0.35  0.06  0.37  0.38 
 
Note: Logit regressions, all specifications include a constant, p values in parentheses, * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5A: Classification of Identity/Ideology Wars (Sambanis, 2000) 
 
Country  Start of the 
War 






Afghanistan  04/78  02/92    * 
Afghanistan  05/92  Ongoing  *   
Algeria  07/62  12/62    * 
Algeria  05/91  Ongoing  *   
Angola  02/61  11/75  *   
Angola  11/75  05/91  *   
Angola  09/92  Ongoing  *   
Azerbaijan  04/91  10/94  *   
Bosnia  03/92  11/95  *   
Burma/Myanmar  68  10/80  *   
Burma/Myanmar  02/83  07/95  *   
Burundi  04/72  12/73  *   
Burundi  08/88  08/88  *   
Burundi  11/91  ongoing  *   
Cambodia  03/70  10/91    * 
Chad  03/80  08/88  *   
China  01/67  09/68  *   
Columbia  04/84  ongoing    * 
Congo  97  10/97    * 
Cyprus  07/74  08/74  *   
Dominican Rep.  04/65  09/65    * 
El Salvador  10/79  01/92    * 
Ethiopia  07/74  05/91  *   
Georgia  06/91  12/93  *   
Guatemala  07/66  07/72  *   
Guatemala  03/78  03/84  *   
Guinea-Bissau  12/62  12/74    * 
India  08/65  08/65  *   
India  84  94  *   
Indonesia  06/75  09/82  *   
Iran  03/74  03/75     
Iran  09/78  12/79    * 
Iran  06/81  05/82  *   
Iraq  09/61  11/63  *   
Iraq  07/74  03/75  *   
Iraq  01/85  12/92  *   
Jordan  09/71  09/71  *   
Laos  07/60  02/73    * 
Lebanon  05/75  09/92  *   
Liberia  12/89  11/91    * 
Liberia  10/92  11/96    * 
Morocco  10/75  11/89  *   
Mozambique  10/64  11/75     
Mozambique  07/76  10/92    * 
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Table 5A continued 
         
Country  Start of the 
War 






Nicaragua  10/78  07/79    * 
Nicaragua  03/82  04/90    * 
Nigeria  01/66  01/70  *   
Nigeria  12/80  08/84  *   
Pakistan  03/71  12/71  *   
Pakistan  01/73  07/77  *   
Peru  03/82  12/96    * 
Philippines  09/72  12/96  *   
Romania  12/89  12/89    * 
Russia  12/94  08/96  *   
Russia  09/99  Ongoing     
Rwanda  11/63  02/64  *   
Rwanda  10/90  07/94  *   
Sierra Leone  03/91  11/96    * 
Sierra Leone  05/97  07/99     
Somalia  04/82  05/88     
Somalia  05/88  12/92  *   
Sri Lanka  04/71  05/71    * 
Sri Lanka  07/83  ongoing  *   
Sudan  10/63  02/72  *   
Sudan  07/83  ongoing  *   
Tajikistan  04/92  12/94  *   
Turkey  07/91  ongoing  *   
Uganda  05/66  06/66  *   
Uganda  10/80  04/88  *   
Vietnam  01/60  04/75    * 
Yemen  05/90  10/94    * 
Yemen, Arab Rep.  11/62  09/69    * 
Yemen, People’s Rep.  01/86  01/86    * 
Yugoslavia  04/90  01/92  *   
Yugoslavia  10/98  04/99  *   
Zaire/Dem. Rep. of Congo  07/60  09/65  *   
Zaire/Dem. Rep. of Congo  09/91  12/96  *   
Zaire/Dem. Rep. of Congo  09/97  09/99     
Zimbabwe  12/72  12/79  *   
 
Note: Wars for which there is no indication whether they are identity or ideology wars are 
not included in the Sambanis data set.  
 